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Abstract
This paper reports the preliminary work under way to analyse the composition of public 
spending in response to increased economic openness in the advanced industrial societies 
over recent decades. The compensation hypothesis predicts that public spending will rise in 
response  to  greater  openness,  especially  trade  competition.  The  globalization  hypothesis 
predicts that public spending will be constrained by increased capital market openness. Our
research  design  distinguishes  between  four  aspects  of  public  spending.  First  it  considers 
spending targeted at producer as opposed to labour market interests. It further distinguishes 
between short-term transfer spending and longer-term investment spending, all of which have 
aspects of compensation spending to them. The principal focus of the research project is to 
analyse to what degree left-right partisanship makes a difference to spending effort, and to 
what degree the patterns vary between different varieties of capitalism. Drawing mainly on 
OECD data for the period since 1980, the modelling and analysis, using pooled time-series 
cross-sectional  data  with  an  error  correction  model,  is  as  yet  at  a  relatively  early  stage. 
Preliminary results suggest that neither trade nor capital market openness is associated with 
increase  spending  efforts  in  the  manner  anticipated  by  the  compensation  hypothesis. A
number of lines of further inquiry are identified. Page 2
Introduction
Budget-making, both revenue-raising and expenditure, is at the core of democratic politics, 
and the allocation of public spending has far-reaching consequences for the livelihoods and 
well-being of any country’s citizens. It is not merely a matter of redistributive politics, of 
who  gets  what,  where  and  when,  but  of  the  state’s  engagement  with  the  politics  of 
production, and how the impact of international economic forces is modulated by domestic 
decision-making. Even though the era of wide-ranging state control may have passed since 
the 1980s, the state continues to be the  ‘gateway’ to any  country’s relationship with the 
international economy (Levy 2006; Weiss 1998; 2003). Indeed, the state’s role is likely to 
become more not less relevant, as the credibility of neo-liberal orthodoxies wane and as states 
are obliged to extend into activities that would have been difficult to contemplate until very 
recently, such as taking on ownership of major banks and committing large sums to economic 
stimulus measures.
This paper takes up the debate about the consequences of increased economic openness for 
patterns  of  public  spending.  Economic  openness  has  several  dimensions,  and  while  trade 
openness  is  the  measure  that  garners  most  attention,  we  are  mindful  that  capital  market 
liberalization  and  intensified  flows  of  foreign  direct  investment  may  also  have  important 
effects. We are most interested in exploring the composition of public spending, and to tease 
out  the  manner  in  which  domestic  institutions  and  interests  may  modify  the  overall 
relationship between openness and public spending. The first section outlines reasons for 
expecting that there will be a relationship between openness and public spending at all. The 
second  section  considers  determinants  of  the  composition  of  spending,  and  sets  out  the 
research design we are working on. The third section reports our preliminary findings and 
outlines the next steps in the investigation.
1. Trade openness and public spending
There is by now a considerable literature on the effects of economic openness on the size and 
composition of the public sector. The topic, if anything, has gained in theoretical interest, 
because it provides a lens on two related area of interest in comparative political economy. 
The first concerns the determinants of the distributive efforts of states in democratic societies. 
The state in market societies is required to support and assist the development of productive Page 3
capacities and growth potential. The state is also expected to underpin at least a minimum of 
material welfare for its citizens, not only because this increases the productive potential of the 
economy,  but  because  this  is  a  normative  expectation  on  which  governments’  electoral 
fortunes may turn and on which the legitimation of the political institutions themselves may 
depend.  The  fiscal  bargain  underpins  political  legitimacy  (Levi  1988).  Within  this,  the 
combination of efficiency-enhancing and legitimacy-procuring policies is central to modern 
democratic politics (Scharpf 2000).
But states vary significantly in the way they combine their policy commitments. The tools of 
comparative  political  economy  that  have  been  found  to  gain  purchase  on  explaining 
systematic variations include a range of institutional and actor-centred variables, stimulated 
by Peter Hall’s classic formulation (Hall 1986). Among these are the constitutional features 
of  the  state  itself  (centralized  or  decentralized,  majoritarian  or  representative  electoral 
system); the degree to which parties of the left or right prevail in shaping policy choices, 
since electoral considerations as well as ideological orientation may  lead governments to 
policies that favour one sector over another; the structure of organized economic interests, 
and the availability of consensus-seeking policy choices; and the structure of the economy 
itself, or ‘varieties of capitalism’, since the main features of the productive capacities of the 
economy may bias feasible decision-sets systematically in one direction over another (Hall 
and Soskice 2001a; Swank 2002). 
The second reason why the effects of economic openness on the size and composition of the 
public sector continue to attract scholarly attention is that this topic raises the question about 
how,  to  what  extent,  and  in  what  ways  the  insertion  of  national  economies  into  the 
international political economy makes a difference to the scope of policy choice of national 
governments.  Domestic  institutions  mediate  how  ‘external’  challenges  are  experienced: 
external influences are of course experienced as real effects within the domestic economy. 
Whether  economies  are  highly  open  and  trade-dependent,  or  relatively  closed  and  more 
reliant on domestic markets (especially if the market is large), will have a bearing on the 
challenges national governments have to face (Frieden and Rogowski 1996; Kahler and Lake 
2003).  Trade  exposure  is  one  form  of  domestic  openness. Increasingly  since  the  1990s 
though, other forms of intensified economic interdependence have emerged, particularly with 
the  liberalization  of  capital  markets,  but  also  with  the  greater  international  mobility  of 
investment capital and the growth in the scale of foreign direct investment (FDI) in rich and Page 4
poor economies alike. The impact of globalization in all these senses is deeply contested, 
though  the  most  dramatic  projections  of  a  race  to  the  bottom  in  terms  of  government 
spending and social provision now seem greatly overstated. The scope for national variation 
in  policy  mix  is  more  extensive  than  previously  thought,  and  domestic  institutions  and 
political partisanship continue to play an important role in shaping policy outcomes (Starke et 
al.  2008).  Nevertheless,  it  seems  clear  that  the  constraints  of  working  within  fluid 
international  money  markets  impose  a  narrower  palette  of  political  choice  on  national 
economies,  particularly  in  market-sensitive  areas  such  as  tax  policy,  also in  deficit 
management  (Ganghof  2007;  Mosley  2003).  The  swift  international  ramifications  of  the 
current crisis have brought financial interdependences clearly into focus (Palma 2009). New 
sources of policy constraint also emanate from networks of international trade agreements, 
including the EU with its multilevel negotiations for market-making and regulation; from the 
European Monetary Union, within which monetary and exchange-rate policies are centrally 
determined, while tax and spending competences are located at national level; and from trade 
and rules set by bodies such as the World Trade Organization (Gilpin 2001; Hallerberg and 
Bridwell 2008; Scharpf 1999). 
Markets and the compensation hypothesis
Interest in the politics of domestic politics of ‘compensation’ through state expenditure goes 
back  at  least  to  the  work  of  Karl  Polanyi,  who argued  that nineteenth-century  economic 
liberalism,  backed  and  enforced  by the  exercise  of  state  power  in  the  era  prior  to  mass 
suffrage,  produced  social  dislocations  that  stimulated  the  development  of  the  labour 
movement and the organization of the political left (Polanyi 1944/2002). The rise of interwar 
European fascism, he argued, cannot be understood without recognizing the delegitimation of 
constitutional systems arising from the pervasive ‘great transformation’ of the social order 
that had been wrought by market liberalism. The reconstruction of political order in the wake 
of World War Two was therefore grounded in ‘embedded liberalism’, the combination of 
international  trade  liberalization  with  the  widespread  acceptance  of  at  least  some  of  the 
principles of the Keynesian welfare state, among the advanced industrial societies (Ruggie 
1982). Since the 1980s, though, the postwar settlement has been unravelling in various ways. 
The new politics of neo-liberalism gained uneven purchase (Prasad 2006). But everywhere 
the scope for an older model of nationally distinctive political economies was narrowed. 
Inevitably perhaps, it was the most distinctive kinds of political economy that first attracted Page 5
analytical attention. David Cameron’s seminal contribution to the explaining the size of  the 
public sector, specified in terms of total government spending, with reference to state size and 
economic openness, was strongly modelled on the Swedish pathway from trade exposure to 
organizational centralization, strong political left, and large welfare state (Cameron 1978).
Peter Katzenstein’s still-influential work on small European states deliberately selected cases 
for study because they were all small, open and wealthy trading economies, and because all 
had evolved complementary domestic adjustment strategies grounded in ‘corporatism’, that 
is,  a  close  articulation  between  organized  economic  interests  and  the  state, on  industrial 
policy, wage determination, and welfare spending (Katzenstein 1985). Public spending was 
channelled  to  both  employers  and  employees  to  underpin  bargained  agreements.  While 
strategies of ‘political exchange’ were by then widespread in linking wage bargaining into the 
domestic politics of inflation control and welfare expansion (Pizzorno 1978), Katzenstein’s
contribution was to link the politics of industrial relations to the broader agenda of domestic 
responses  to  the  international  political  economy in  a  broader  context  of  developmental 
strategy. 
These distinctive models of political economy experienced new challenges from the 1980s 
on.  But  in  addition,  their  generalizability  might  raise  some  questions.  Katzenstein 
distinguished  between a  liberal  and  a  social  democratic  variant  within  his  corporatist 
strategies, typified by Switzerland with its relatively stronger employer interests on the one 
hand, and Sweden with its strong links between trade unions and Social Democratic party on 
the other. But all the states he studied were what might now be termed coordinated market 
economies,  a  category  that  encompasses most  continental  European  countries  plus  Japan
(Amable 2003; Hall and Soskice 2001b; Soskice 1999). The productive capacities of these 
economies all tend to be structured in similar ways. They involve stronger inter-firm strategic 
coordination than  would  be  the  case  in  either  the  more  market-responsive  liberal  market 
economies (broadly the English-speaking world), or in countries with a stronger role for the 
state in industrial policy (such as France and the Mediterranean southern European countries) 
(Hall and Soskice 2001a). Institutions might not all complement one another and many points 
of friction arise when conflict over reform initiatives in one policy area create new tensions in 
another (Amable 2009; Crouch 2005; Streeck and Thelen 2005). But both product markets 
and labour markets tend to vary systematically across these clusters; and patterns of welfare 
state provision are differently structured too (Esping-Andersen 1990; 1999).Page 6
Later studies analysing a much wider range of countries have found that ‘the results confirm 
the existing literature on the public sector as a compensatory mechanism in open economies’; 
‘higher levels of trade systematically lead to a larger public sector’ (Adserà and Boix 2002, 
pp.244,  253),  at  least  when  government  consumption as  measured  with  reference  to the 
volume of state revenues. The main determinants of the larger public sector seem to arise 
from  the  state’s  role  in  directly  supporting  declining  economic  sectors  to  alleviate  the 
disruptive effects of intensified competition on domestic markets, and in increasing welfare 
spending in response to the dislocating effects on employees. Rodrik found similar effects, 
also across a wide range of countries (Rodrik 1998). 
Why it is that welfare effort might be greater in small states, as Cameron and Katzenstein 
argued, has been subject to investigation. Alesina and Wacziarg argue that small size makes a 
significant difference (Alesina and Wacziarg 1998). But Down argues that the link is not 
between  openness  and  increased  spending,  but  volatility  and  spending,  where  small 
economies are also more open. Openness per se does not cause volatility, or spending. Small 
population  size,  hence  a  limited  domestic  market  (and  not  small  geographical  area  as  is 
modelled  in  Adserà  and  Boix)  means  more  volatility.  Trade  exposure  implies structural 
adjustment,  with  a  corresponding  demand  for  compensation  (Down  2007,  p.16). But 
paradoxically, it may be that integration into wider market opportunities decreases volatility, 
especially for small states, since the risk of asymmetric shock is spread (Down 2007, p.4). 
This argument is still contested, and Kim, for example, argues that the evidence still points to 
externally  driven  risk,  and  domestic  perception  of  such  risk,  as  a  driver  of demand  for 
increased welfare compensation (Kim 2007). 
Iversen and Cusack, who are globalization sceptics on this matter, find ‘no link between 
either trade openness or capital market openness and volatility of the real domestic economy’ 
(Iversen and Cusack 2000, p.319).  They hold that deindustrialization rather than trade-driven 
adjustment creates the dislocation effects: public spending soared in western countries even 
as the industrial working itself contracted dramatically. Dreher and his colleagues also argue 
that globalization as such has little or no effect on the composition of spending, and that this 
is most strongly shaped by domestic political factors (Dreher et al. 2008). However, Burgoon 
reports conflicting findings (Burgoon 2001); these issues are contested too. And it may be 
that Iversen and Cusack underestimate the degree to which domestic deindustrialization is 
itself indirectly affected by transnational shifts in the composition and location of production, Page 7
causing intensified domestic need to engage in trade-related structural adjustment.
Globalization and the efficiency hypothesis
Compensation spending might work in facilitating adjustment to greater trade openness, but it 
may be that the effects of globalization constrain how, to what extent, and across what time-
span the compensation hypothesis might hold empirically. The argument about globalization, 
in this context, is that intensified competitiveness pressures limit the degree to which states 
might be able to increase or even hold steady any particular volume of public spending: 
efficiency constraints depress welfare and other public spending efforts. ‘Stateness’ itself 
might  even  come  into  question (Evans  1997).  However,  it  seems  that  such  far-reaching 
conclusions  would  be  premature.  It  seems  that  efficiency  effects  have  not  displaced 
compensation effects, and it is difficult to envisage how they could in any simple fashion. 
The manner of adjustment to globalization pressures, according to Garrett’s extensive work, 
continues  to  be  mediated  through  domestic  institutions. Where  appropriate  institutional 
combinations  exist,  particularly  where  left-oriented  parties  can  rely  on  the  coordinating 
capabilities  of  allied  trade  unions,  even  large-scale  welfare  states  can  continue  to  thrive 
(Garrett 1998; 2000; Garrett and Mitchell 2001).  Other authors similarly stress the design of 
institutions – especially the role of corporatism, consensus democracy, and the centralization 
of  state  constitutional  structure  – for  shaping  strong  compensation  policies  (Schulze  and 
Ursprung  1999,  p.345;  Swank  2001;  2004).  Rodrik,  with  a  global  span  of  country 
observations, argues strongly against the existence of uniform effects  of  globalization on 
domestic politics, and like Stiglitz, criticizes attempts to generalize supposed best-practice 
policy  approaches along  the  lines  of  the ‘one  size  fits  all’  approach  favoured  by  the 
‘Washington consensus’ during the 1980s and 1990s (Rodrik 2007; Stiglitz 2003).
But  quite  how  the  compensation  and  efficiency  effects  might  interact,  in  the  context  of 
globalization  understood  in  terms  of  capital  market  liberalization,  continues  to  present 
analytical challenges. More recent analyses have found a weakening or even non-existent 
association between change in openness and the size of the compensation effect. There is 
some  question  over  whether  the  time-scale  of  observations  might  make  a  significant 
difference to results. Data that extend to the mid-1990s, as in much of Garrett’s work, would 
not  yet  have  captured  the  strongest  effects  of  globalization,  the  scale  of  which  became 
particularly apparent with the East Asian financial crisis of 1998 and has again come sharply 
into  focus  with  the  current  international  crisis.  It  may  be  that  compensation  effects  are Page 8
genuinely present at an earlier stage of adjustment to increased trade interdependence, but 
that  over  time,  the  efficiency  effect  of  both  more  intensified  competition  and  of  market 
disciplines constrain public spending and push back welfare effort. Busemeyer, for example, 
presents  a  nuanced  argument  that  goes  beyond  either-or  possibilities,  to  characterize  the 
subtle  ways  in  which  real  decision-makers  make  decisions  under  shifting  constraints 
(Busemeyer 2009). Typically, quantitative modelling flattens out trends over time, so that the 
possibility of a shift in the curve within a time-series would need to be explicitly tested. 
2.  The  composition  of  public  spending  and  the  politics  of 
distribution
Indicators of compensation effort are quite varied, with dependent variables that may include 
the volume of revenue, total government consumption, total public spending, and total social 
spending. But in addition to the size of the public ‘effort’, however conceptualized, the issue 
of how this is apportioned is far from obvious. 
As Schulze and Ursprung note, in  a wide-ranging review of  current research, the classic 
argument is that ‘governments accommodate to rising demand for better social insurance 
provision  in  the  context  of  increasing  international  economic  integration’  (Schulze  and 
Ursprung  1999,  p.335).  There  is  some  attitudinal  data  supporting  the  claim  that  these 
expectations work through electoral channels (Balcells Ventura 2004). A further refinement 
distinguishes between government commitments to broad spending measures, or to narrowly 
targeted measures. Explaining variations in countries’ provisions requires looking not only at 
the kind of assets employees have and the preferences that result, to which governments 
respond in order to secure electoral support, but also at the type of institutional arrangements 
that channel these links. Rickard found that, other things being equal, representative electoral 
systems respond more strongly to increased electoral demand for narrow or targeted benefits, 
even  without  the  direct  mobilization  of  these  interests  through  interest  organization  or
recourse to collective action (Rickard 2009).
But employees at risk of displacement are not the only ones who will seek assurances from 
governments; firms are if anything more directly at risk, so industry interests may also place 
demands for assurances of government backing. An important first dimension of distribution 
is therefore the allocation of spending as between labour market interests and industry or firm Page 9
interests. In the case of firms, what we would expect would be direct subsidies. Increasingly 
since the 1990s, targeted subsidies have been ruled inadmissible both by EU competition 
rules, with the advent of the Single European Market in 1992, and by new World Trade 
Organization  rules  since  1995.  But  the  rules are  made  up  of  complex  and  patchwork 
provisions, and many wealthy countries, including EU member states, continue to avail of 
them, even in areas where their admissibility is more clearly questionable (Blauberger 2009; 
European Commission 1997). 
An alternative perspective on these issues suggests that employees themselves might have 
differentiated  interests.  Those  who  lose  their  jobs  will  expect  ex  post  compensation 
guarantees in the form of welfare supports. But those who are still at work might have a 
vested interest in the ongoing security of their jobs, and might therefore prefer government 
spending ex ante on adaptation measures directed toward vulnerable sectors. Rickard, for 
example, seeks to analyse governments’ propensity to spend on social welfare as opposed to 
sectoral  measures  for  a  large  number  of  developing  countries  across  the  postwar  era,  by 
analysing the relative proportion of total spending accorded to each, regardless of how large 
the total volume of spending is relative to GDP. She finds a marked shift from welfare to 
sectoral spending (Rickard 2008). Similarly, Burgoon undertook a sophisticated analysis of 
types  of  state  spending,  identifying  clusters  of  alternative  potential  coalitions  between 
employees and employers in their preference structures (Burgoon 2001, pp. 520-25). 
However,  if  what  we  are  interested  in  is  the  disposition  of  political  decision-makers  to 
respond  to  different  sectors  of  the  electorate as  part  of  an  overall  strategy  of  economic 
development,  balancing  productive  and  distributive  imperatives,  that  is,  if  we  are  most 
interested  in  the  steering  capacity  of  states,  we  consider  that  it  is  worth  distinguishing 
between  spending  that  is  primarily  firm-oriented  and  that  which  is  primarily  employee-
oriented.  A  research  design  analysing  cross-class  coalitions  of  interest,  and  the  different 
preferences  of  employees  for  job  security  over  unemployment  compensation,  offers a 
different perspective; but it does not displace the continuing relevance of the question of 
broad class-oriented spending preferences. 
A second dimension of interest concerns the longer-term as opposed to short-term approach 
to  compensation  spending.  As  Schulze  and  Ursprung  argue,  among  advanced  industrial 
societies, ‘governments competing for foreign investment will... restructure their expenditure Page 
10
towards  more  privately  productive  public  inputs  at  the  expense  of  transfers  and  non-
productive  government  consumption’  (Schulze  and  Ursprung  1999,  p.298).  Short-term 
compensation  spending  alleviates  immediate  hardships  through  transfer  spending.  But 
adjustment to increased trade openness, especially where openness also means seeking to 
attract more mobile capital investments, means a shift in orientation over time away from 
direct  transfer  compensation  and  toward  indirect  productivity-enhancing  investment 
spending. Openness would be expected to create incentives to governments to increase their 
commitment to supply-side spending. Less-developed countries tend to commit rather less to 
employee-related insurance categories (Shelton 2007, pp. 2231-3). Developed countries start, 
on the whole, with already well developed social transfer mechanisms. But we would expect 
the  advanced  societies  to  display  a  rising  propensity  toward  investment  spending  in  the 
context of increased openness, broadly conceived.
This presses us to consider a third dimension, which is spending that would be primarily 
firm-oriented as opposed to spending that is primarily labour-market oriented, in the context 
of  supply-side  or  investment  or  long-term  spending  commitments.  The  former  category 
includes  investments  in  fixed  infrastructure,  transport,  communications  technologies.  We 
could also consider public investment in research and development in this category. There are 
many  ways  in  which  states  can  support  industrial  development apart  from  recourse  to 
selective  industrial  or  firm-oriented  subsidies,  which  may  including  tariffs,  cultivation  of 
national champions in strategic industries, and so on. These were extensively used by the 
richest countries in their pathways to prosperity, also by the wealthiest tier of Asian countries. 
In recent years, WTO rules have severely limited the scope for developing countries to use 
them (Chang 2002; 2008; Kohli 2004). But many kinds of supports that include non-fiscal 
provisions  such  as  grants,  licensing  arrangements,  regulatory  provision,  as  well  as  fiscal 
incentives such as preferential corporation tax rates, are still core features of state industrial 
policy in wealthy countries (Block 2008; Ganghof 2000; Ó Riain 2004). We cannot capture 
all of this in our analysis of public spending commitments. But we think there should be 
interesting  variation  in  the  degree  to  which  states  commit  to  spending  on  productivity-
enhancing capital investments. 
Longer-term investment spending that primarily benefits employees principally means human 
capital formation, or spending on education and skills development. In a world of increased 
capital  mobility,  fragmentation  of production  systems,  and  intensified  competition  for Page 
11
investment capital, employees in richer countries have no cost-based competitive advantages 
and must rely on increased labour productivity to support continued job creation in most 
sectors. Every country wants to ‘move up the value chain’, and securing high-technology 
processes  on  the  one  hand,  and  high-end  traded  services  on  the  other,  are  the  pathways 
toward sustaining high living standards. There is a potential trade-off between investment in 
high-end quality-enhancing manufacturing and services-heavy employment, as the German 
and  Austrian  cases indicate (see  Table  6  below).  Moreover,  the  issue  of  foreign  direct 
investment in services, and deregulation of service activities, is often far more conflicted than 
in the case of manufacturing, since so many areas of key national economic activities are 
potentially  affected (utilities  and infrastructure,  aviation,  banking,  etc.),  and  restrictive  or 
anti-FDI policies are quite common in these areas (Stephen 2009). 
Therefore we might consider not only that states may need to balance short-term transfer 
spending against long-term investment spending, but also that within investment spending, 
different  combinations  of  firm-oriented  and  labour-market-oriented  investments  may 
develop.
Compensating whom for what?
Our research questions build on the reflections set out in the preceding section and may be 
summarized in Figure 1 below. Page 
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What  we  are  most  interested  in  explaining is the  composition  of  governments’  spending 
commitments  in  the  context  of  increasing  economic  openness,  not  only  in  response  to 
electoral incentives, but also consistently with the steering mechanisms available to them. 
States  function  in  embedded  ways  in  political economies  that  are  not  all  the  same.  We 
consider that while electoral and constitutional institutions may well be important in shaping 
the  profile  of  states’  spending  commitments,  along  with  the  partisanship  profile  of 
government, the scope for government intervention is also strongly shaped by the kind of 
market economy that is under consideration (Hall 2007). 
1. Short-term producer-oriented transfer spending
The  first  distinction  we  made  was  between  firm-oriented and  labour-market-oriented 
compensation  payments.  What  we  have  in  mind  here  is  narrow  or  targeted  benefits,  the 
mechanisms whereby governments can directly alleviate the pain of intensified competition Page 
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that  may  lead  to  loss  of  livelihood. Subsidies  to  sectors  or  firms  include  all  subsidies, 
including EU subsidies that provide direct supports. We factor in EU agricultural subsidies 
here  too,  because  these  have  provided  an  essential  friction-reducing  resource  to  manage 
declining employment in agriculture across Europe. 
2. Short-term employee-oriented transfer spending
Considering employee interests, we leave to one side, for now, issues about broader targeting 
such as the extent of coverage of social insurance schemes, and non-fiscal labour market 
protection, that are part of providing security of employment in work and which are common 
in coordinated and ‘mixed’ market economies. Direct social welfare compensation in Anglo-
Saxon  liberal  market  economies  is  means-tested  and  time-limited.  Scandinavian  labour 
markets typically provide generous protection for workers, not jobs; security in the labour 
market rather than job security. Continental and Southern European countries tend to provide 
generous welfare assurances alongside strong job protection (Ebbinghaus 2006; Vail 2008).
We focus only on measures directly targeted at those who are most vulnerable within the 
labour market.
There  are  conceptual  and  empirical  issues  involved  in  capturing  what  is  at  issue  here. 
Spending on unemployment benefit is the first measure we use. This may vary mainly with 
growth in GDP, as rate increases may simply reflect rising living standards. It mostly varies 
directly  with  the  level  of  unemployment in  an  economy,  and  this  may  be  the  result  of 
domestic  or  international  business  cycle  fluctuations,  or  national  fiscal  mismanagement 
issues, rather than being directly attributable to the effects of changes in trade openness as 
such. Our measure takes unemployed benefit spending normalized against GDP. We expect 
that most fluctuations in economic performance will be captured within the model itself, and 
have  not  (yet)  tried  to  control  for  variations  in  domestic  consumption  or  international 
business cycles. We do not think it appropriate to control for the level of unemployment as 
such.
We  also  consider  that  public  spending  on  keeping  people  in  work  through  provision  of 
(generally  short-term)  job  subsidies  in  selected  sectors  constitutes  a  direct  trade-related 
expenditure measure. Active labour market schemes to reintegrate displaced workers falls 
into the same category. Unfortunately data limitations at this stage have not permitted us to Page 
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include these variables in our model as yet.
We anticipate that cross-national pattern of the composition of government spending is likely 
to  vary  systematically  between  these  two  categories. We  would  expect  that  stronger  left 
government  composition  will  be  associated  with  higher  levels  of  labour-market-centred 
effort. We anticipate that (non-agricultural) sectoral or producer-oriented subsidies will be 
more apparent in coordinated market economies, where the creation and destruction of firms 
may have more damaging consequences for long-term growth prospects and can therefore be 
less readily accommodated than in liberal market economies.
3. Longer-term producer-oriented investment spending
In the longer term, most governments actively support measures to improve competitiveness 
and enhance trade performance on domestic and export markets. But the pathways through 
which they do this may vary, and country experiences are likely to have developed somewhat 
differently over recent decades. Until the 1970s, virtually the only way in which the large-
scale public infrastructure investments necessary for economic growth could be undertaken 
was through the public sector. Since then, different combinations of privatization, for-profit 
management  of  major  infrastructures, and public-private  partnerships,  have  become  more 
common.  EU  tendering  rules  also  enforce  transnational  competition  in  tendering  rules, 
competition  in  provision  of  utilities,  and  other  market-making  provisions  that  reduce  the 
scope of discretionary state interventions. Nevertheless, we anticipate to find differences in 
the profile of countries’ spending efforts that depend on the relative weight of the political 
left and right. Both Boix and Mulas-Granados have argued that Social Democratic parties 
display  a  preference  for  public-sector-led  supply-side  investments,  and  that they  seek  to 
maintain high spending levels through reliance on broad-based revenue sources. They also 
argue that Social Democratic governments are reluctant to cut the size of public investments 
and will maintain these even at the expense of the generosity of transfer payments (Boix 
1998; Mulas-Granados 2006). In contrast, governments of the right tend to prefer strategies 
of reducing total tax liabilities and relying more strongly on market mechanisms for capital 
side development. They prefer to promote private sector investments through fiscal incentives
based on tax levels and rates, tax expenditures, management of tax liability rules governing 
depreciation rates, and so on. 
Although spending on research and development is vital for technological innovation and Page 
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growth-enhancing prospects, we have decided to exclude public spending in this area from 
consideration in our analysis (at this stage anyway). The extent to which countries rely on 
state-financed  as  opposed  to  in-firm  R&D  spending  do  not  seem  to  display  systematic 
patterns.  And  it  is  quite  likely  that  much  of  the  public  effort  put  into  supporting  R&D 
investments  is  based  on  tax  incentives  and  indirect  public  spending  in  areas  such  as 
technology  parks  and  university-industry  collaborations,  which  is  hard  to  capture  in  this 
particular kind of analysis of variations in spending patterns. 
4. Longer-term labour market-oriented investment spending
Those who lose their jobs through trade-related competition, or because they are in declining 
industries that cannot survive growing economic interdependence, may be capable of being 
reintegrated  into  the  workforce  in  the  short  term.  But  in  the  medium  to  long  term,  new 
investments in the labour force are required to facilitate structural economic adaptation, and 
to equip new generations of employees to work in higher-skilled activities and in emergent 
sectors of economic activity. Investment in new skills and acquisition of new education-based 
competences are likely to prove vital.
Countries vary systematically in the volume of public spending put into education at each 
level, though this is not directly related to performance in standardized attainment tests in, for 
example, maths, science, and literacy (OECD 2008). But we consider that it is important to 
decompose  different  aspects  of  public  investment  in  human  capital,  as  we  anticipate 
systematic  differences  in  the  manner  in  which  this  is  undertaken  across  varieties  of 
capitalism. The distinction normally made is between general and specific skills acquisition
(Estevez-Abe et al. 2001). In liberal market economies, inter-firm competition reduces the 
incentives for employer investment in high-level skill development. Employers tend to rely 
on state-supported  education that is not immediately productivity-enhancing. Certification 
and grade-attainment in general education provides a signalling mechanism for employers for 
hiring  purposes.  In  coordinated  market  economies,  it  is  more  common  for  employer 
coordination to provide on-the-job skills acquisition of a kind that is specific to the firm or 
industry in question, financed through some combination of employer funds and state inputs. 
The distinctions between the way education provision tracks into labour market opportunities 
are apparent in the structure of second-level education, and this is where most of the research 
comparing  education  and  skills  training  tends  to  be  concentrated  (Allmendinger  1989; 
Crouch et al. 1999; Hassel 2007; Iversen and Stephens 2008). But there is also a case to be Page 
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made for considering the different state inputs to vocational-technical and general-academic 
education  standards  at  third  level.  There  is  a  trend  toward  higher  levels  of  educational 
attainment in general in the wealthy societies. Comparing profiles of spending at third level 
captures  more  of  the  real  variation  in  labour  force  competences  and  how  this  affects 
economic growth capabilities (Culpepper 2007; UNESCO 2006). We would expect, in line 
with this literature, that liberal market economies would show a bias toward general rather 
than  specific  skill  development,  captured  through  profiles  in  educational  attainment; that 
coordinated market economies would lean toward high-level as well as lower-level technical 
skills; and that Scandinavian economies would show a mix of these (Hardiman 2009). 
Openness and spending trends
Economic openness can mean different things. The most common definition is probably the 
sum of the value of imports and exports expressed as a proportion of GDP. Trade openness in 
this sense shows considerable variation, and as many scholars have noted, tends to be more 
pronounced  in  small  economies (represented  by  population  size,  that  is, where  domestic 
markets are quickly saturated) than in larger economies. Growing volumes of trade need not 
result in any increase in overall openness, and indeed it can be consistent with a decline in the 
openness measure. Table 1 below shows that even in 1980, countries had widely dispersed 
degrees of openness, with Belgium at the top with 117% and Japan ranking last with 28%. 
But our research questions focus on what happens when economies become more open, then 
what we need to capture is the degree of change between two points. We take countries’
profiles at  the  starting-point  for  granted;  we wish  to  analyse  the  change  wrought  in  the 
internal  politics  of  compensation  spending in  response  to  the  change  in  the  degree  of 
openness that has occurred across the time-period under observation.
Neither the economies that were most openness-prone nor those that were most relatively 
closed  in  1980  were  necessarily  the  ones  that  experienced  the  greatest  change  over  the 
following two decades. Ireland experienced the most dramatic increase in openness, of about 
80 percentage points, between 1980 and 2000. Increases of between 10 and 30 points were 
more common. Norway (in EFTA but not the EU) and Japan (experiencing a long slump and 
with ongoing issues about import resistance to US goods) both display a decline in openness 
on this measure.Page 
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Table 1. Trade Openness, % GDP
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Points change 
1980-2000
Ireland 102.9 109.5 107.2 139.8 184.1 81.2
Belgium 117.0 140.0 137.5 131.3 166.4 49.4
Canada 54.9 54.7 52.0 72.2 86.5 29.7
Spain 31.5 40.9 35.5 44.8 61.2 29.7
Netherlands 107.6 123.4 108.5 112.2 133.4 25.9
Sweden 60.6 68.9 59.6 71.9 86.0 25.4
Germany 44.0 51.2 49.2 47.4 66.4 22.5
Austria 71.0 73.0 74.3 70.3 89.6 18.6
Denmark 68.8 76.1 69.7 71.2 87.2 18.3
Portugal 59.2 68.6 72.4 66.7 74.3 15.1
Switzerland 70.8 72.9 70.1 65.7 85.7 14.8
Australia 31.7 33.2 32.6 38.7 44.8 13.1
Finland 64.1 56.6 47.0 65.0 76.4 12.4
France 44.1 47.4 44.0 44.4 56.2 12.2
Greece 51.4 46.4 45.9 42.6 61.6 10.2
Italy 46.1 45.4 39.4 50.0 55.6 9.5
New Zealand 60.3 61.6 53.4 57.3 69.3 9.0
UK 51.9 56.5 50.6 57.2 58.1 6.2
USA 20.8 17.2 20.5 23.4 26.3 5.6
Norway 80.0 78.4 74.3 69.7 76.1 -4.0
Japan 28.2 25.1 19.9 16.8 20.2 -8.0
Source: OECD 
An  alternative  indicator  of  economic  openness  is  the  flow  of  foreign  direct  investment 
(outward as well as inward), as summarized in Table 2 below. Ireland’s performance topped 
the list in 1980, and again in 2000. But already having a strong profile on FDI does not 
necessarily make a country perform most strongly over time in increasing this. It seems the 
main work in setting a development trajectory had already been laid down in Ireland by 1980, 
and FDI flows increased by only some three points. In contrast, Sweden, Spain and Finland 
increased their FDI flow exposure by some eleven points, with six other countries coming in 
with increases of between six and nine points. Once again, the change between the two dates 
seems to capture something different from the rank order.Page 
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Table 2. FDI Flows, % GDP
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Points change 
1980-2000
Sweden 6.3 9.7 12.9 15.2 17.2 11.0
Spain 4.5 6.6 9.4 11.0 15.0 10.6
Finland 6.5 8.6 11.2 12.7 16.9 10.4
New Zealand 7.5 11.5 14.0 14.9 16.3 8.8
Italy 4.8 6.7 8.6 10.7 12.7 8.0
Germany 5.3 7.0 8.2 8.7 13.3 7.9
Austria 8.5 9.8 11.8 11.5 16.1 7.6
Portugal 8.6 11.4 10.8 10.8 15.9 7.3
Denmark 9.3 10.8 13.2 15.5 16.3 7.0
France 6.2 8.1 9.7 9.3 12.4 6.1
Norway 10.4 11.5 12.8 13.4 15.8 5.4
Switzerland 13.1 15.3 15.6 15.5 18.0 4.9
Australia 8.9 10.1 12.3 13.2 13.6 4.7
USA 5.6 5.4 6.8 7.6 9.5 3.9
Netherlands 15.3 16.2 17.3 17.3 18.9 3.6
Belgium 16.0 17.0 18.6 18.6 19.4 3.5
Ireland 16.5 17.0 16.9 17.8 19.6 3.1
Canada 13.6 12.8 13.1 14.9 16.5 2.9
UK 11.8 12.4 12.9 13.3 14.4 2.7
Greece 8.9 9.7 8.2 8.3 11.0 2.2
Japan 2.8 3.6 6.4 4.7 4.3 1.5
Source: OECD
Our research interest is in specific components of social and non-social spending. But it may 
be of interest to consider what the trends are in total social spending in OECD countries over 
time. This is given in Table 3 below. A cursory inspection reveals that the profile of change 
in countries’ openness does not result in any commensurate change in levels of total social 
spending. In line with classic analyses of domestic political partisanship, countries with the 
strongest  profiles  of  either  Social  Democratic  or  Christian  Democratic  government 
composition by 1980 were the ones with the largest welfare spending commitments, though
this  was channelled  and  targeted  differently  within  each  cluster  of  countries  (Esping-
Andersen 1990; van Kersbergen 1995). In Table 3 below, we note a drop in the proportion of 
social spending relative to GDP after 1995 in many countries. But Frank Castles and his 
collaborators  have  argued  that  this  should  not  be  interpreted  as  welfare.  Rather,  as  a Page 
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composition of total budgets, social spending has held its own, and when spending cutbacks 
have been undertaken, non-social elements of budgets, including education and training, as 
well as general economic affairs, defence and policing, and debt financing, have been the 
areas  that  have  been  cut  most  obviously (Castles  2007).  We  must  bear  in  mind  that  the 
trajectory of the total size of the public purse, and of total tax revenues, flattened out across 
most countries from about 1995 on. 
Total social spending grew most rapidly in Greece and Portugal, both of which started out in 
1980  with  small  welfare  states  and  high  public  expectations  of  welfare  improvements  as 
democratization  bedded  down  under  recurrent  left-of-centre  administrations.  The  largest 
welfare states in 1980 still topped the league table in 2000, though there was much less 
disparity by this date in total social spending; the biggest spenders held a fairly steady-state 
relative to their GDP. Ireland and the Netherlands show a drop in the volume of total social 
spending relative to GDP. But this can be misleading: we should also note that in Ireland, 
during its  ‘Celtic  Tiger’  years  1994-2000,  real  growth  in  social  spending  simply  did  not 
match very rapid increases in GDP. (It is common in Ireland to use a parallel measure of 
GNP, because GDP rose more rapidly than GNP because of the significance of FDI. The 
volume of repatriated profits and the somewhat opaque character of transfer pricing within 
foreign-owned forms made GNP seem a more reliable indicator. GNP figures bring Ireland 
closer to international average levels of taxation and spending. But they do not fundamentally 
alter the trajectory of the statistics).Page 
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Table 3. Total Social Spending, % GDP
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Points change 
1980-2000
Greece 11.5 17.9 18.6 19.3 21.3 9.8
Portugal 10.8 11.0 13.7 18.1 20.2 9.4
Australia 11.0 13.0 14.1 17.1 17.9 6.9
France 20.8 25.8 25.3 28.4 27.6 6.7
Japan 10.3 11.2 11.3 13.9 16.1 5.8
Norway 16.9 17.9 22.6 23.5 22.2 5.4
Italy 18.0 20.8 19.9 19.8 23.2 5.2
Spain 15.6 17.8 20.0 21.5 20.4 4.8
Switzerland 13.9 14.8 13.5 17.5 18.0 4.1
Germany 23.0 23.6 22.5 26.6 26.3 3.3
Finland 18.4 22.8 24.5 27.4 21.3 3.0
Austria 22.6 23.9 23.7 26.6 25.3 2.8
Canada 14.1 17.3 18.4 19.2 16.7 2.6
UK 16.6 19.6 17.2 20.4 19.1 2.6
New Zealand 17.1 18.0 21.8 19.0 19.1 2.0
Belgium 23.5 26.1 25.0 26.4 25.3 1.8
USA 13.3 12.9 13.4 15.4 14.6 1.3
Denmark 25.2 24.2 25.5 28.9 25.8 0.6
Sweden 28.6 29.7 30.5 32.5 28.8 0.2
Ireland 16.8 21.8 15.5 16.3 13.6 -3.1
Netherlands 24.2 24.2 24.4 22.8 19.3 -4.8
Source: OECD
Noting the comment above about using GDP as a denominator in these data, and in line with 
arguments that the volume of public spending governments can commit is constrained by the 
resources available to them, it may be interesting to inspect cross-national trends in GDP over 
time, and changes in GDP. This is set out in Table 4 below. Page 
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Table 4. Gross domestic product, volume, at 2005 PPP, USD





Ireland 43,273 49,077 61,763 77,464 122,498 160,618 117,345 271%
Australia 299,820 348,342 409,653 468,784 575,312 673,165 373,345 125%
USA 5,834,449 6,842,798 8,039,574 9,078,554 11,096,494 12,421,875 6,587,426 113%
Spain 574,964 616,179 767,785 827,383 1,011,765 1,188,102 613,139 107%
Norway 106,254 125,186 136,226 163,578 195,997 218,707 112,454 106%
New Zealand 49,738 59,991 63,120 72,526 84,409 101,342 51,604 104%
Canada 567,370 649,669 748,721 815,396 998,378 1,132,000 564,630 100%
Portugal 113,974 119,119 156,952 170,789 208,628 217,912 103,938 91%
UK 1,039,480 1,154,231 1,359,071 1,474,189 1,745,427 1,968,812 929,331 89%
Finland 86,540 99,007 117,020 112,412 141,750 160,632 74,092 86%
Netherlands 315,593 333,869 392,864 440,029 536,543 572,901 257,308 82%
Japan 2,178,171 2,536,902 3,206,150 3,457,387 3,630,107 3,872,844 1,694,673 78%
Austria 156,580 168,111 194,752 216,873 252,405 275,502 118,922 76%
Sweden 170,252 186,520 211,562 218,768 257,751 291,652 121,399 71%
Denmark 106,638 121,929 130,796 146,819 169,012 179,888 73,250 69%
France 1,115,358 1,206,663 1,415,986 1,499,907 1,722,847 1,867,206 751,848 67%
Greece 166,934 168,073 178,749 190,173 225,311 276,799 109,865 66%
Belgium 205,629 215,523 250,907 271,538 310,077 336,393 130,764 64%
Italy 1,062,829 1,156,187 1,348,695 1,437,611 1,579,275 1,649,898 587,069 55%
Switzerland 180,045 194,028 224,277 225,395 249,367 265,751 85,706 48%
Germany - - - 2,274,366 2,511,592 2,583,174 NA NA
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No 85, 2009. (There is a break in the German series due to 
reunification)
The scale of Ireland’s super-normal growth during the 1990s becomes clearer here. Countries 
that  grew  by  100%  or  over between  1980  and  2000  include  Australia,  the  USA,  Spain, 
Norway,  New  Zealand,  and  Canada.  The  slowest-growing  OECD  countries  include 
Switzerland, Italy, Belgium, Greece, France, Denmark, Sweden.
OECD  countries  vary  considerably  in  size. We  need  to  be  mindful  of  the  argument  that 
population size, as a proxy for speed of market saturation, has a bearing on the propensity 
toward openness. We also need to consider that increases in spending on all the elements of 
variables we are interested in may be driven as much by rising per capita demands as by any 
change  in  political  priorities.  The  rate  of  expansion  of  populations  itself  shows  a  lot  of 
variation, as Table 5 below shows.Page 
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Table 5. Population Size ('000) and Change in Population (%)
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
% change 
1980-2000
Germany 61,566 61,024 63,254 81,661 82,160 33%
Australia 14,695 15,788 17,065 18,072 19,153 30%
Canada 24,516 25,843 27,698 29,302 30,689 25%
USA 227,225 237,924 249,623 266,278 282,194 24%
New Zealand 3,144 3,272 3,363 3,673 3,858 23%
Switzerland 6,319 6,470 6,712 7,041 7,184 14%
Greece 9,642 9,934 10,089 10,634 10,917 13%
Netherlands 14,150 14,491 14,951 15,459 15,926 13%
Ireland 3,401 3,540 3,503 3,601 3,790 11%
Norway 4,086 4,153 4,241 4,359 4,491 10%
France 53,880 55,284 56,709 57,844 59,049 10%
Japan 117,060 121,049 123,611 125,570 126,926 8%
Finland 4,779 4,902 4,986 5,108 5,176 8%
Austria 7,549 7,558 7,718 8,047 8,110 7%
Spain 37,527 38,420 38,851 39,388 40,264 7%
Sweden 8,311 8,350 8,559 8,827 8,872 7%
UK 56,330 56,554 57,237 58,025 58,886 5%
Denmark 5,123 5,114 5,141 5,233 5,340 4%
Portugal 9,819 10,014 9,873 9,847 10,229 4%
Belgium 9,859 9,858 9,967 10,137 10,251 4%
Italy 55,657 56,498 56,737 56,745 57,189 3%
Source: OECD Labour Force statistics 
The expansion of the German population by one-third between 1980 and 2000 is of course 
the  result  of  reunification  in  1990 (the  break  in  the  statistics  is  not  noted  here).  The 
populations of Australia, Canada, the USA, and New Zealand owed much of their expansion 
by  one-quarter  and  more  to  immigration.  Countries  with  the  lowest  rates  of  population 
growth, in low single figures, include Italy, Belgium, Portugal, Denmark, and the UK.
Table 6 shows that the outflow from agriculture across OECD countries had already largely 
been completed by the 1990s, compared with 1960 when many countries still had 20% or 
25% of their populations working on the land. Although only showing data for 1996 and 
2006, we can also see some variation in the degree of reliance on services. The USA, Britain, 
Sweden,  and  the  Netherlands have  the  largest  proportions  engaged  in  service  activities. 
Portugal has the lowest, with Italy, Spain, and Greece next, then Ireland, along with Germany 
and Austria. But the reasons are somewhat different, and would need to be explored taking Page 
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account of the composition of industry. 
Table 6. Composition of the workforce, 1996-2006
  10 765    17.3    69.4    64.9   10 190    22.2    3.5    5.0    21.4    22.4    75.1    72.6
  4 124    6.6    67.3    61.5   3 918    6.5    5.5    7.3    28.2    32.7    66.2    60.0
  4 647    7.4    59.9    56.9   4 264    14.1    2.0    2.4    24.7    25.9    73.4    71.8
  17 654    18.3    73.2    67.5   16 484    22.8    2.6    4.0    22.0    21.8    75.4    74.2
  2 904    2.9    77.0    74.1   2 759    6.4    3.0    4.0    23.6    27.0    73.4    69.0
  2 670    5.9    73.8    70.3   2 434    14.9    4.7    7.5    25.8    27.3    69.6    65.2
  27 575    7.7    64.2    61.0   24 717    12.2    3.4    4.5    22.9    25.9    73.8    69.7
  41 521    5.0    69.1    61.9   36 978    3.8    2.3    3.0    29.8    35.4    67.9    61.6
  4 880    13.1    53.8    46.5   4 453    15.1    12.0    20.3    22.0    22.9    65.9    56.8
  2 114    40.2    62.1    49.7   2 015    52.8    5.6    10.7    27.6    27.8    66.8    61.4
  24 662    7.4    51.2    43.5   22 738    14.0    4.3    6.4    30.5    33.5    65.2    60.0
  66 570 - 0.8    66.2    62.6   63 820 - 1.6    4.3    5.5    28.0    33.3    67.7    61.2
  8 597    14.4    71.0    60.1   8 261    18.3    3.0    3.9    19.2    22.4    77.8    73.8
  2 209    17.8    71.6    68.1   2 117    20.8    7.1    9.5    22.3    24.7    70.5    65.8
  2 446    9.2    76.1    73.9   2 345    11.5    3.3    5.1    20.9    23.2    75.8    71.7
  5 587    16.7    72.3    62.1   5 130    16.4    11.8    12.4    30.7    31.4    57.5    56.2
  21 585    29.5    60.4    47.1   19 660    53.4    4.8    8.4    29.7    29.8    65.5    61.8
  4 671    6.1    76.1    75.8   4 341    9.5    2.0    2.9    22.0    26.1    76.0    71.0
  4 477    9.1    79.8    73.8   4 304    9.0    3.8    4.7    23.8    27.4    72.5    67.9
  29 942    6.4    69.0    66.6   28 203    9.6    1.3    2.0    22.0    27.3    76.7    70.8
  152 672    12.9    69.9    69.9   144 427    14.0    1.5    2.8    19.8    23.8    78.7    73.3
  185 808    9.8    64.3    57.8   170 189    14.2    3.6    5.0    26.3    29.9    70.1    65.1
  564 339    10.1    62.1    59.3   526 968    11.8    5.5    8.3    24.8    27.8    69.7    63.9
Sources:
1. Labour Force Statistics: 1986-2006, OECD, Paris, 2007;
International Migration Outlook: SOPEMI, 2008 Edition, OECD, Paris, 2008.
2.
StatLink: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/467508228555
For some countries, data for the latest years are estimated.  For further details, see the source.
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3. The model and preliminary analysis
The approach to modelling we have undertaken to date has been hindered by data limitations. 
OECD data series are unevenly available for extended time series. More specific indicators 
are available only for the period since 1990.
The modelling approach that we used here is an OLS (ordinary least squares) with PCSEs 
(panel-corrected standard errors).  The data are made up of several (four in most cases here, 
for now) variables over several years for a number of countries. The idea of this modelling 
approach is to fit the underlying model to the data while taking the country effects and the 
effects of having time series data into account.
The country effects (fixed effects or constants associated with each country) are used to take 
the country differences into account. The time series aspect of the data is taken care of by 
means of the iterative Prais-Winsten procedure, which allows us to estimate the regression 
while taking the nature of the time series into account.
There are several factors which dictate the form of the model that we can apply to the data 
using this method. For example, if the time series are non-stationary (as they are in our case), 
it is not sensible to use variables that have not been differenced (the results obtained in such a 
case will be spurious). In some cases it may be possible to remove the non-stationarity by 
including a trend term, but this is not possible here. It should be noted that using categorical 
variables in the iterative Prais-Winsten procedure does not produce sensible results.
We worked with a differenced model as follows: 
t t t t X Y a Y ν γ + ∆ + + = ∆ −1
where  t t i t ε ν ρ ν + = −1 in all cases.
That is to say, the change in the response variable in the current year is the sum of a country 
IL[HGHIIHFWĮ, plus the change in the response variable in the preceding year (the lagged variable
noted here), plus the change in the independent explanatory variables, plus the error term.
All the indicators outlined in Figure 1 above have turned out to present data problems of 
various sorts. Our data series are limited, and the indicators we think will really capture the 
variables  we  are  interested  in are  not  all  available  for  the  range  of  years  we  want.  The Page 
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variables we have been able to get, so far, are not all quite appropriate to the task. What we 
have are approximate measures of the variables of greatest interest. To date, the variables we 
have worked with are the following:
Totsocexp = Total Public Social Expenditure (%GDP)
Sub = Subsidies (%GDP)
Educ = Training + Secondary + Third level Education(%GDP)
Unempb = Uneployment Benefits (%GDP)
GFCF = Gross Fixed Capital Formation (%GDP)
Flow = FDI flows (%GDP)
Topen = Trade Openness (%GDP)
Popn = Population (‘000s)
Data sources and their limitations are summarized in Appendix 1. 
Furthermore,  explanatory  variables  we  are  keen  to  test  have  proven  difficult  to  include 
satisfactorily  in  the  model,  particularly  those  related  to  partisanship.  Available  left 
government incumbency measures include problems of both categorical variables and zero 
estimates, which make their inclusion in this model difficult. Similarly, we would like to 
estimate the effects of government duration and electoral system effects on the propensity to 
engage in long-term as opposed to short-term spending commitments. None of this has been 
possible as yet.
The results are summarized in Table 7 below.Page 
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Table 7. Summary of preliminary modelling
Total Public Social Expenditure
Change in totsocexp (last year) 0.282133 0.001
Change in Trade openness -0.04542 0.001
Change in Flows -0.20215 0.01
Change in popn 0.000151
Education
Change in education (last year) -0.16981 0.1
Change in Trade openness -0.00966
Change in Flows -0.06848
Subsidies
Change in subsidies (last year) 0.000233
Change in Trade openness -0.00225
Change in Flows -0.01696
Change in population 1.53E-06
Unemployment benefit
Change in UB (last year) 0.479453 0.001
Change in Trade openness -0.01397 0.01
Change in Flows -0.01078
Gross fixed capital formation
Change in GFCF (last year) -0.1
Change in Trade openness 0.00732 0.1
Change in Flows -0.01538
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
These findings suggest that neither trade openness nor FDI flows shows a positive association
with the change in the extent of expenditure under each heading relative to the underlying 
model. Capital market openness did not prove at all significant and has been excluded from 
the  summary  data  reported  here. There  is  one  exception,  where  there  is  a small positive 
association in the case of trade openness (though not FDI flows) and gross fixed capital 
formation; this is the only case in which a positive correlation of any sort is observed. The 
strongest determinants of change in the dependent variable, relative to the underlying rate of 
change common to all countries in the model, is the lagged effect of the previous year’s 
spending commitments. We had anticipated the negative finding in the case of total social 
spending. We had anticipated positive associations in the other cases. 
Full country effects are shown in Table 8 below. A more complex set of findings is apparent 
here, with some positive and some negative outcomes in evidence. At this point, it is difficult 
to  interpret  the  findings  in  any  consistent  manner;  we  must  await  better  data  first  and Page 
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foremost.









Australia 0.2405479 0.00544 0.0093627 -0.02303 -0.242775
Canada -0.0092851 -0.03179 0.014096 0.03642 na
Denmark 0.105876 0.07084 -0.0048631 -0.008904 0.257879
Finland 0.1329192 -0.0621 0.0204288 0.0159 -0.053527
France 0.2478041 -0.01901 -0.0007372 0.02193 0.019884
Ireland 0.090601 -0.09275 -0.009166 -0.14 0.058539
Italy 0.2158381 -0.1131 0.007922 0.02841 0.068201
Japan  0.0726582 -0.02887 0.0270235 0.00001399 0.021427
Netherlands -0.1327784 -0.01037 -0.0415551 -0.04964 -0.027536
New Zealand 0.0272131 -0.03384 -0.0031408 -0.03205 -0.067607
Portugal 0.5421729 -0.1043 0.0400102 0.003847 -0.008001
Spain 0.2058302 0.01592 0.0337437 0.03506 -0.159628
Sweden 0.1491438 -0.03142 0.0154072 0.05975 0.001698
UK 0.0530681 -0.05838 0.0207364 -0.03685 -0.045166
USA -0.1549356 0.001309 0.0020628 -0.0339 0.205746
However, the negative trend in association between openness and all variables except total 
fixed capital investment do invite at least some speculative discussion. It may be that, as 
Busemeyer suggests, the effects of openness are not consistent across a stretch of time, but 
that the trend is in fact curvilinear and that the attempt to model it as a steady relationship 
over time is misplaced (Busemeyer 2009). A closer probing of underlying trends will be 
needed before modelling associations to see if a pooled time-series analysis may be masking 
more than it reveals.
Further, it may be that the way these relationships work within European countries is not the 
same as in non-EU member states. As Adserà and Boix suggest, European unification may 
not mean the same thing as increased trade openness in the classic sense. Reducing trade 
barriers  in  order  to  create  a  single  large  market  which  itself  is  tariff-protected  may  be 
equivalent to risk-reduction through market expansion. It could be seen as ‘an alternative 
(and more cost-effective) response to globalization than expanding the welfare state of each 
European nation one step further’ (Adserà and Boix 2002, p.256). This might require us to Page 
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rethink entirely the nature of social risk associated with increased openness. 
Conclusion
Data limitations constrain what we can say with confidence about our research to date, and 
better quality data over longer time series are a prerequisite to making progress. We have 
argued  that  public  spending  in  response  to  increased  openness  can  be  targeted  toward 
producer or labour market interests, and that it can be directed toward short-term transfer 
payments or longer-term investment expenditure. We are confident that the overall research 
design yields hypotheses that are worth investigating further. We think there is likely to be 
left-right differentiation in the way state spending effort is channelled. We think spending 
profiles are also likely to be conditioned by the state’s embeddedness in different varieties of 
capitalism. We think there  are likely to be different short-term and long-term profiles to 
spending effort that are also shaped by partisan and variety-of-capitalism effects. We would 
also like to explore patterns of long-term investment spending further in relation to shifts in 
the  composition  of  economic  activity  (from low-skill  to  high-tech  manufacturing;  from 
industrial to services employment). 
We have as yet been unable to test for the impact of many variables that are still subsumed 
under  our  country  fixed  effects.  In  particular,  we  plan  to  find  appropriate  measures  for 
government partisanship, also of the duration of government, which will work within our 
model (given the problems we have encountered with categorical variables and observations 
with values of zero).
To date, our preliminary model finds relatively little impact of increased economic openness 
on changes in the profile of spending relative to the underlying model. We are therefore 
particularly interested in exploring further whether and to what degree a single underlying 
model might really capture consistent relationships over time. This paper reflects the first 
stage of our investigation, and has been based on using pooled time-series regression with an 
error correction model. But this might obscure more than it reveals about changes in the 
dynamics  of what  is  going  on.  Competing  theories  about  the  expanding  effects  of 
compensation  pressures  on  public  spending,  as  opposed  to  the  constraining  effects  of 
globalization, might not be zero-sum alternatives. There may be a more complex interplay at 
work between governments’ imperative to respond to developmental needs of the economy Page 
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and  distributive  issues  in  the  society,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  realities  of  the  market 
constraints within which states make these decisions on the other. We have conceptualized 
this  differentiated  relationship  with  reference  to  varieties  of  capitalism.  But  a  more 
curvilinear relationship may also be at work over time for all states.
Finally, we also wish to explore further the possibility that economic openness within the EU 
has a distinctive meaning for the politics of domestic political adaptation, compared with 
non-EU OECD member states. Page 
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Appendix 1. A note on data sources and limitations
Data  have  in  many  cases  been  taken  directly  from  databases  at  the  OECD  website, 
www.SourceOECD.org,  from  Economic  Outlook;  Labour  Force  Statistics;  National 
Accounts; OECD Social Expenditure database SOCX 
Also KOF Globalization Index http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/ (Teorell et al. 2009)
We  are  also  indebted  to  two  online  databases  where  a  wide  range  of  variables  can  be 
accessed:
(Armingeon et al. 2005), Comparative Political Dataset 1, at
http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/ind
ex_ger.html
and (Teorell et al. 2009), The Quality of Government Dataset, at http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/
Aggregate data are available for 1980-2003, with some missing country variables.
Data  on  public  capital  formation,  active  labour  market  spending,  in-work  job  subsidies 
(private sector), public sector ALM job creation schemes, education, skills training, are only 
available in detail from 1990.
Data on ‘left partisanship’, ‘government duration’, and ‘changes in government’ are readily 
available; but as noted in the text, they contain categorical measures and zero values that 
present modelling problems.Page 
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